
Pakistani Migration and Diaspora Religious Politics in a Global Age

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MIGRATION HISTORY, DIVERGENT IDENTITIES, AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Pakistanis form a global diaspora that emerged after World War II, following the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. Major concentrations of Pakistanis exist in the United States, Canada, and Norway, and smaller Pakistani communities are also to be found in most Western European countries, in Australia, and in postcolonial developing countries, especially the Middle East and Gulf States, Malaysia, Indonesia, and East and southern Africa (where many arrived before partition). This entry focuses on the Pakistani diasporic community in Britain, the earliest and by far the largest and most prominent internationally, which emerged in the 1990s as a major player in global diaspora religious politics.

Migrants from the Indian subcontinent, among them Pakistanis, began arriving in Britain in substantial numbers after World War II. They were recruited to assist with the reconstruction of the British economy, entering low-skilled jobs abandoned by the local population in the postwar boom years. The initial migration was of single

young men, usually originating from smallholder peasant farms in the Punjab. Many of the earliest arrivals were East Punjabis from the more developed, highly populated regions of Jullundur and Hoshiapur (now in India), which suffered from chronic land shortages and boasted better educational facilities. A major stream of arrivals in the early years were students from this region studying in British universities. Most factory workers arrived through chain migration, following in the footsteps of relatives or co-villagers, but many were also recruited by agents who found them jobs in the British economy. The early arrivals were, on the whole, relatively skilled and educated, at least to the primary or high school level. Some had served in the Indian or Pakistani armies, and others had worked in factories in Pakistan or India prior to their arrival.

The Pakistani diaspora in Britain can only be understood fully in terms of its national origins in Pakistan, a postcolonial nation created during the final years of British colonial rule in India. The partition of British India in 1947 came as a reluctant capitulation to the demands of the Muslims of India for national autonomy.

National independence was granted in the so-called Muslim majority provinces of Punjab, East Bengal, Sindh, Baluchistan, and the North West Frontier Province after attempts by the leader of the Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, to persuade Gandhi and Nehru to create a decentralized, multicultural solution to postcolonial India failed. During World War II the Muslim League had supported the British in the fight against Nazi Germany and they were thus owed a moral debt by the outgoing colonial regime. The result of partition was a blood bath as Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims massacred each other in the Punjab and north India. This was followed by a large-scale exchange of populations. Many Indian Muslims settled in Karachi, but the vast majority of Punjabi refugees from India were granted land abandoned by Sikhs and Hindus in the Punjab itself and were soon well integrated into Punjabi society.

Despite the traumatic events of partition, a shared history and culture mean that Pakistanis in Britain cannot be thought of apart from the broader South Asian diaspora. Moreover, their relationship with Britain as their former colonial master colors first-generation migrants' oppositional diasporic sensibility, while creating common ground (in their shared knowledge of English, love of cricket, and respect for democratic institutions) for mutual regard and understanding. Overseas South Asians in Britain and elsewhere need to be understood as forming a complex, segmented diaspora composed of four nationalities (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka), four major religions (Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Christianity, along with some Buddhists), and a multiplicity of languages and regional popular cultures. Among South Asian migrants to Britain, Bengalis, Punjabis, and Gujaratis predominate, and they share regional languages across religious and national divisions.

During the 1960s, a stream of migrants continued to arrive from West Punjab, primarily from rain-fed *barani* areas of Jhelum, Gujrat, and Gujranwala. These migrants, too, originated mainly from smallholder peasant farms, but many also came from Azad Kashmir. The latter cohort were displaced by the Mangla Dam built by Pakistan. The new Mirpuri arrivals used the compensation awarded to them by the Pakistani state to migrate to Britain. These migrants from Mirpur (later they called themselves Kashmiris), who speak a dialect of Punjabi, were on the whole less educated and skilled than other Punjabi and

Gujarati Muslim immigrants. They also had far less experience of urban living and working in Pakistan before their arrival. Many came from impoverished backgrounds. Many settled in northern towns, working in the ailing wool and cotton mills of Yorkshire and Lancashire. Indeed, they propped up this industry for some 20 years before it finally collapsed. Other notable migration cohorts to Britain were from East Africa in the early 1970s, following Africanization policies in Kenya and Tanzania and the expulsion of South Asians from Uganda by Idi Amin. After some hesitation, the British government agreed to recognize British passport holders' right to settle in Britain. Migrants from East Africa were, on the whole, skilled or highly educated, but many arrived penniless, having been forced to abandon their properties and savings behind. Many ultimately gravitated to the London and East Midlands areas, particularly to Leicester. A further early cohort of migrants from the Indian subcontinent were doctors recruited to the National Health Service. Some Pakistani migrants also arrived in Britain following the withdrawal of British troops from former colonies such as Cyprus, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.

In the early stages, Pakistani migrants concentrated in large numbers in regions of Britain that were suffering from acute labour shortages, mainly the West Midlands, Yorkshire, and Lancashire, and in cities such as Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester, Newcastle-on-Tyne, and Glasgow in Scotland. Kashmiris, who are said to comprise 60% of the Pakistani population (there are no accurate figures), settled mostly in Birmingham, Bradford, Oldham, and surrounding towns. South Asian trading communities also emerged in most major cities, serving the culinary and other ethnic consumer demands of the growing migrant population, and establishing many other small businesses, particularly in the clothing and textile trades.

The post-elections 1971 civil war between West and East Pakistan, which ended (after intervention from India on the East Pakistan side) with the capitulation of the Pakistani army and a split of the western and eastern wings into Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively, was followed in Britain by splits in mosque management committees and hitherto unified welfare and cultural associations. The splits were, on the whole, amicable and not marked by violence. They point, however, to the underlying connection between diasporic institutions and national affiliations. More recently, tensions over Kashmir

between India and Pakistan, leading to possible nuclear confrontation, have been associated with the growth of an active Kashmir lobby in Britain.

Broadly speaking, by 2001 Pakistanis were more concentrated in the north and west Midlands, East Africans and Indians in the east Midlands and the outer London area, and Bangladeshis in inner London, particularly the East End. Sikhs were highly concentrated in Southall (an outer suburb of London) and Birmingham, Indians in Ealing (London) and Leicester. Despite these demographic tendencies, South Asian migrant-settlers are to be found throughout Britain. They share ethnic consumer tastes and regional cultures and are subject to similar ethnic and racist stereotyping by other Britons. Economically, however, the populations have diverged somewhat, as will be spelled out further.

The tightening of immigration laws affected patterns of migration to Britain. Initially, migrants from the subcontinent were defined as British subjects and were free to enter the country at will. In 1962, a work voucher scheme was introduced, limiting migration, and although initially this accelerated the scale of male migration, after 1969 migration was restricted to incoming marriage partners and nuclear family reunions, including children under the age of 18. Pakistan allows dual nationality, and after 1969, most Pakistani migrants working in Britain applied for British passports and began to bring over their wives and children for fear they might lose their entitlement to British citizenship. What had initially begun as a pattern of circulatory labor migration, with young migrant men expecting to come to Britain to work for short periods to save money before returning home, turned into a process of permanent settlement. Ideology lagged behind the realities of sinking roots locally, leading to a "myth of return," an apt term coined by Badr Dahya (1974), a social anthropologist who studied the early years of Pakistani migration and settlement in Birmingham and Bradford. The myth of return had consequences for patterns of investment, savings, and marriage, and continues to affect Pakistanis as a diaspora retaining strong ties and commitments in the subcontinent.

The arrival of wives and families had a radical impact on patterns of community formation and demographic trends. According to the 2001 U.K. census, there are approximately 750,000 Pakistani immigrant-settlers and their children living in Britain out of a Muslim population

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of 1.6 million and a South Asian population of 2 million. The latter includes about 1 million Indians and 250,000 Bangladeshis. The highest concentrations of Pakistani settlers are in Birmingham (100,000) and Bradford (70,000).

Pakistanis bear complex identities both as Muslims and as South Asians. Hence, for example, there are 75,000 Pakistanis living in Greater Manchester out of a population of 125,000 Muslims, which includes also Middle Eastern Arabs, Indian Muslims, and Bangladeshis. There are 130,000 South Asians in Greater Manchester, including Hindus and Sikhs as well as Indian Muslims and Bangladeshis. Both for Muslims and for South Asians living in Greater Manchester, the city of Manchester is a commercial, religious, and cultural hub, with restaurants, delicatessens, and other ethnic shops catering to the whole South Asian and Muslim population. South Asians and Middle East Arabs are prominent in the city as cloth merchants, clothing manufacturers, wholesalers, and market traders, and they also own a variety of other businesses. The more affluent live in gilded ghettos in the suburbs of Cheshire. A similar complex intersection of South Asian and Muslim diasporas, with subethnic variations, can be found in other parts of Britain around major conurbations such as Birmingham, London, and Leicester.

STUDIES OF PAKISTANIS IN BRITAIN

It is perhaps a truism that diasporas are complex and heterogeneous social formations. They differ both historically and in terms of the particular social and economic context of settlement. Perhaps of all the New Commonwealth postwar migrant groups to arrive in Britain, Pakistanis have been studied most extensively. This has allowed for comparisons across different British cities, towns, and regions, highlighting commonalities and challenging simplistic generalizations. Early studies in the 1960s of Pakistanis in Birmingham by Badr Dahya and by John Rex and Robert Moor (1967) in and Bradford by Dahya and Verity Saifullah-Khan (see Dahya, 1974) were followed in the 1970s by studies of Christian and Muslim Pakistanis settled in Bristol by Patricia Jeffery (1976) and of Pakistanis in Rochdale by Muhammad Anwar (1979), and by further studies of Pakistanis in Manchester by Pnina Werbner (2002), in

Oxford by Alison Shaw (1988; reprinted 2000), and in Bradford by Philip Lewis (1994/2000) in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

More recent studies of first-generation Pakistanis in Oldham by Virinder Kalra (2000) are paralleled by studies of second-generation Pakistanis based on interviews, in London, by Jessica Jacobson (1998) and of school girls by Tehmina Basit (1997) and Farzana Shain (2000). There have been studies of Muslim councillors in Britain by Kingsley Purdam (2000), in Leicester by Ahmed Andrews, and on local level politics in Birmingham and Bradford by Yunas Samad (1997). A doctoral thesis on transnational Pakistani marriages in Bristol by Katharine Charsley reflects on changing migration patterns from Pakistan at the turn of the twenty-first century. Home Office statistics show an influx of 15,000 prospective marriage partners (male and female) from the Indian sub-continent arriving in Britain in 2001 alone, the vast majority arranged by parents for their British-born children. Islam permits marriage with a wide range of close kin and affines, and the majority of Pakistani marriages continue to take place within the *biradari*, a local agnatic lineage, and, more widely, an ego-focused kindred of traceable affines and consanguineous kin. The notion of *biradari* mediates between kinship locality and *zat* (caste), and *biradaris* are ranked and reflect class and caste status.

Comparative statistical analyses of Pakistanis have been based on the 1991 census by Roger Ballard and on the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities by Tariq Modood et al. (1997). A wide range of studies of South Asians in Britain, encompassing Pakistanis, deals with local-level politics and ethnic leadership, housing, health, education, voting patterns, labor relations, gender, small business, second-generation identity, popular culture and music, neighborhood and school relations, and television viewing. The South Asian diaspora in Britain is quite evidently a much studied ethnic migrant-settler group, forming a large and visible entrepreneurial population resident both in inner-city areas and in affluent suburbs of large cities. There have also been comparative studies of mosques by Ceri Peach and of Sufis by Ron Geaves, both of which include Pakistanis among other Muslim groups.

In addition to such academic studies, key policy documents in the late 1990s and early 2000s reflect on specific issues affecting Muslims and South Asians in

Britain. Most prominent among these is the report on "Islamophobia" by the Runnymede Trust (1997) on racism suffered by Muslims in Britain, by Humayun Ansari for the Minority Rights Group International (2002) on forced marriages, by Yunas Samad and John Eade for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2002), and on the riots in Oldham, *Community Cohesion*, commissioned by the Home Office. These reports focus mainly on the apparent alienation and self-segregation of Pakistanis in Britain, an issue returned to later. Marriage is a loophole enabling migration to the United Kingdom despite strict immigration controls. A Home Office (2002) white paper on migration also addresses the issue of forced marriages in which parents attempt to compel daughters and sometimes sons to marry close relatives against their will, often during family visits to Pakistan. While divorce and remarriage are permitted according to Islam, they are regarded as dishonoring the family. This, along with the demand by young people for the right to choose, has led to a steady increase in "honor" killings, especially in the case of girls caught with their boyfriends or who marry men against the wishes of the extended family. Cases are reported of girls running away from coercive home environments and of wives escaping violent husbands and seeking protection in Asian refuges for battered women. So far, coverage of these issues has been mainly by the media, but a London-based advocacy group, Southall Black Sisters, lobbies and reports regularly on issues of domestic violence within South Asian marriages.

CLASS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

Statistical and anecdotal evidence points to growing internal divisions based on wealth and education among Pakistanis settled in Britain. As a group they are also statistically more disadvantaged than Indian settlers, although this disguises the common routes of upward social mobility pursued by both the Pakistani and Indian middle classes and other successful entrepreneurs. Residence in deprived northern cities with ailing economies has hindered Pakistani entrepreneurial activities, and a depressed housing market in these regions has made it difficult to move. The low class resources of first-generation Kashmiris in particular and residence in inner-city areas have limited

access to good schools and made educational mobility difficult, although there is evidence of Pakistani girls bucking this trend. Hence, one finds the phenomenon of second-generation Punjabi-, Urdu-, and Gujarati-speaking Muslims in big cities such as Manchester or London successfully entering higher education and moving into the professional middle class, while the majority of Kashmiris in peripheral towns fail to achieve basic educational qualifications and increasingly adopt a British working-class culture of youth gangs and inner-city turf fights. Research is scarce, but it seems that some of these gangs continue to flag their Islamic identity.

Despite the wide range of studies on Pakistanis, few have looked at the class dimensions of Pakistani migration to Britain, an issue more often highlighted in studies of the South Asian diaspora in the United States. The assumption appears to be that most Pakistani migrants in Britain come from highly conservative rural, uneducated backgrounds. Exceptionally, Werbner's (1990/2002) study in Manchester, *The Migration Process*, analyzes the class structure of local Pakistani immigrant-settlers in order to explain the interactions among class, lifestyle, entrepreneurship, and social networking in creating an impetus toward social change and urbanism, even among migrants originating from rural backgrounds. Manchester has a large middle-class population which includes former students, doctors, and professionals, along with expatriate representatives of Pakistani banks, commercial agencies, companies, and airlines, all of whom come from urban educated backgrounds. This has affected gender roles, entrepreneurial activity, and symbolic consumption among virtually all Pakistanis in the city, whatever their background. Werbner shows that increases in wealth have led to profligate displays of consumption and agonistic rituals, especially weddings. Others anthropologists, such as Saifullah-Khan, have debated the implications of class for ethnic representation.

Broadly speaking, it is clear that most British cities were settled by cohorts of urban, middle-class, educated Pakistanis, many of whom arrived as students or doctors. They form the core of a relatively affluent entrepreneurial class of mostly Punjabi or Urdu speakers from higher Muslim caste groups who ventured very early on into entrepreneurial activities. Among these, East Punjabi Arains, a caste of vegetable growers, have been successful as traders and wholesalers since the early period of

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settlement. There are a few notable exceptions to the dominance of Punjabis, Urdu speakers, and Gujarati Muslims. Thus, Bestways, a major national chain grocery wholesaler, is owned by a Kashmiri.

Entrepreneurial success has also been determined, however, by place of settlement. Major industrial cities such Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, Newcastle, Glasgow, and Oxford (which has a large rental market) afforded a hospitable economic environment for aspiring entrepreneurs, while British northern towns in Lancashire and Yorkshire presented far fewer opportunities for small business ventures outside the ethnic niche. Most first-generation Pakistani entrepreneurs began as factory workers, accumulating some of the start-up funds needed. These were augmented by an institutionalised system of long-term, interest-free loans between fellow migrants, money saved (often by wives) in rotating credit associations known as *kommitti*, and, in the food and clothing industries, by credit extended to new retailers by established South Asian wholesalers. Business niches included, in the first instance, the ethnic grocery food and *halal* trade, "Indian" restaurants, and South Asian fabric shops and travel agents. From the start, Pakistanis in major conurbations also began marketing ready-to-wear garments in open air markets as well as wholesaling and manufacturing cheap clothing. These enterprises relied on the existence of a pool of cheap labor, including family labor. Some firms, such as Joe Bloggs, based in Manchester, have become giant multi-million concerns with their own brand names. Certain small towns, such as Rochdale and Preston, have become major centers of manufacturing. Entrepreneurs followed each other into particular trading niches in entrepreneurial chains and formed vertical networks in which credit was extended among wholesalers, manufacturers, and retailers. During the 1990s, the clothing and knitwear niches was badly hit by cheap imports from South East Asia and competition from new shopping malls, but the trade nevertheless laid the basis for the affluence of a whole generation of South Asians in cities such as Manchester, Birmingham, and Leicester. The food industry has continued to expand and prosper.

Other economic niches established by Pakistani immigrants were in the housing rental market. Rooms in lodging houses were initially let to incoming fellow migrants, but after the latter bought their own houses,

rental was mainly to non-Asian tenants, particularly university students in big university cities, but also to young professionals, government-funded asylum seekers, and welfare recipients. Possibly the best studies of Pakistani entrepreneurs in the housing market were conducted early on, by Rex and Moore (1967) on immigrant overcrowding in the twilight zone in Birmingham, and Badr Dahya (1974) on Pakistani landlords in Birmingham and Bradford and their economic rationality in investing in house ownership, even if houses did not appear to be desirable properties from a British perspective, an argument put later by Davies (1985) for Newcastle. Dahya's analysis was borne out by the lucrative housing market that South Asians, including Pakistanis, uncovered. By 2000, there were large numbers of Pakistani landlords of low-cost rental property in all major cities where a vibrant rental market existed. This excluded some of the more depressed towns in the north of England.

Most migrants to Britain have also invested in houses and property in Pakistan, often buying houses in towns and cities adjacent to their villages of origin and, in the case of the lucky few who managed to acquire plots, in major cities such as Islamabad or Lahore. The fact that so much of their savings was siphoned off for investments in Pakistan, which often brought no financial returns, has, however, been detrimental to the business success of Pakistanis in Britain compared to other South Asians. Where migrants have decided to plough all their savings into Britain, as was the case for East African refugees, for example, this has facilitated the expansion of their businesses. It is also true, however, that as many of the older migrant generation reached retirement age, they left their properties in England to their children and returned to live in Pakistan, in houses hitherto standing empty. They relied on British state pensions, whose real value is multiplied tenfold in Pakistan.

In addition to food, housing, clothing, and textiles, Pakistanis have also carved out a niche in transport, and in many towns they dominate or have a large share of the taxi-driving business. Virinder Kalra (2000) studied Pakistani taxi drivers and Indian takeaway owners in Oldham. Taxi driving is a lucrative, flexible, but highly risky business: Passengers may be violent or racist, and there have been several cases of murders. Nevertheless young Pakistanis without formal qualifications can find

work within the ethnic economy as taxi drivers, waiters, overlockers, packers, and clothing machinists. There is some evidence that a few South Asians have also entered crime, protectionism, and racketeering, including drug and human trafficking, although they by no means dominate this trade. The Muslim prison population rose in the 1990s, to stand at over 5,500 in 2002, a significant increase.

The 2001 U.K. census of England and Wales revealed that labor participation rates differ markedly for Pakistanis, Indians, and Bangladeshis, despite parity in numbers (one million Indians and one million Pakistanis and Bangladeshis). While there were 509,000 Indians in the labor market, there were only 290,000 Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. This disparity is probably due to a number of factors, in particular the relative youthfulness of the Muslim South Asian population, somewhat higher rates of unemployment, and lower participation rates for Muslim women in the labor market, but other factors are yet to be fully explored. Of those employed, around 15%—75,000 Indians and 46,000 Muslim South Asians—were either fully or part-time self-employed (U.K. Census 2001, Table T13, p. 231).

Rates of participation obviously have implications for the collective wealth of these different South Asian communities: One in two Indians is in employment, but only one in 3.5 Pakistanis or Bangladeshis, and average incomes for the latter groups are also lower. The figures do not of course reflect the high involvement of Pakistanis and South Asians more generally in the informal economy, and in casual work in the ethnic economy. According to the census, over 10,000 Indians were in the highest-ranking business and public service professional occupations, but only 4,500 Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were (3,500 Pakistanis). Taking account, however, of the lower class resources of Kashmiris, who comprise more than half the Pakistani settler population, entry rates of Pakistani non-Kashmiris into business and public service professional occupations appear similar to those of Indians. This strengthens the argument that the South Asian community cannot be disaggregated simply by nationality or religion, but must be looked at in terms of class background, migration history, and subcontinental regional origins.

The figures indicate a growing polarization between the haves and have-nots among Pakistanis in particular.

This has to be considered alongside the fact that Pakistanis as Muslims have had to contend with a series of international crises, beginning in 1989 with the Rushdie affair, which have generated anti-Islamic sentiment and a growing sense of alienation and oppositional consciousness among large segments of this diaspora.

ISLAM, THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DIASPORIC CONSCIOUSNESS

While South Asian culture in Britain has been relatively innovative and responsive to diasporic experiences, this has been far less the case for the transnational movement of Islam into Britain. Instead, the wide variety of different religious streams, denominations, and movements evident in South Asia has been transposed into Britain almost wholesale, along with the migration of Muslims from the subcontinent. Major religious organizations and movements such as Tablighi Jama'at, Jama'at-i Islami (in Britain known as the UK Islamic Mission), Deobandis, and Ahl-e Hadith compete with new Islamic movements such as the al Muhajirun or Khizb-ul-Tahrir, imported from the Middle East, which are attractive to some young South Asian Muslims. All these groups have their institutional embodiments in the United Kingdom. In Manchester, for example, a city of some 30,000 Muslims, there are 22 mosques, each representing a stream, sect, nationality, and city catchment area. In some neighborhoods with high concentrations of Pakistanis, there are four or five mosques within walking distance of one another. This reflects the fact that Islam in Britain remains on the whole nationally and ethnically divided.

Until the publication of *The Satanic Verses*, Muslims in Britain were perceived as a law-abiding minority. The diasporic public sphere that they had evolved, although critical of India, Pakistan, Arab regimes, and the West, was local and hidden, invisible to outsiders. Pakistanis were often locked in the early settlement period in fratricidal factional disputes in central mosques, and divided into tiny, fragmented *tonga* voluntary organizations. It was difficult to imagine their mobilization as a united front. The global crisis that came to be known as the Rushdie affair, with book burning in Bradford screened

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on TV worldwide, and the death sentence *fatwa* pronounced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, which caused a major international rupture between Iran and the West, brought this subterranean Muslim local-level politics into the public eye.

The Satanic Verses, a novel written by an eminent diasporic Pakistani author living in London, Salman Rusdhie, was an iconoclastic critique of Islamic fundamentalism and of Thatcherite Britain, and was part of a broader South Asian postcolonial literary movement that has created a culturally hybrid form of the English novel. The novel was regarded by most Pakistanis in Britain, and by Muslims worldwide, as highly offensive. It led to a *fatwa* by the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran, denouncing the author as an apostate and sentencing him to death. The ensuing international crisis led to a radical change in the public political activism of Pakistanis in Britain. A large anti-Rushdie demonstration in London in 1989 mobilized Muslims, primarily South Asians, across the different sectarian and organizational divides.

This process of becoming more visible has continued. Since the Rushdie affair, a series of other international crises has disrupted processes of Pakistani integration into Britain and induced a sense of widening alienation. The 1991 Gulf War, conflict in Bosnia, Palestine, Kashmir, and Chechnya, the events of and subsequent to 11 September 2001, the nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have all mobilized Pakistanis and other Muslims on to the streets of Britain, with Muslim representatives regularly invited to Downing Street and Muslim MPs openly protesting against the war in Afghanistan.

Historically, then, as in the case of many immigrant settler groups in the religiously plural West, Islam began for South Asian Muslims arriving in Britain in the post-war era as an acceptable, legitimate incorporative identity, nonracialized, highly cultural, and highly valorized. The mosque was the central locus of cultural value, the focus of communal factional politics, a point of mobilization, a haven for incoming migrants, and a basis for solidarity in times of crisis. It provided a platform for subaltern orators and lay preachers excluded from British formal political arenas.

Over time, as the settler community grew, there was an efflorescence of religious spaces, with the bewildering variety of different religious streams, denominations, and

movements in South Asia transposed into Britain. This process of replication was often associated with acrimonious splits, so that by the mid 1970s most religious groups also had their own mosques.

Importantly, this was a male-dominated process. Women created Islamic spaces in the home, and came to dominate the interdomestic domain, a domain of sociality and of ritual and religious celebration focused on familial, friendship, and neighborhood networks. Women have also been involved in philanthropic work for the home country. Alongside these, newly formed women Pakistani Islamic movements, such as al Hudda, which reject customary traditions and espouse a fundamentalist return to the Koran and veiling, have been imported into the United Kingdom since the 1990s.

This points to a further historical process that occurred in Britain, the diasporic encounter with other Muslims coming from the Middle East. This did not lead to convergence, however. Language, culture, and nationality have remained a major block to homogenization of British Islam, despite public invocations of unity, and despite the fact that mosques are open for worship to any Muslim, whatever his (and sometimes her) affiliation, kinship, or *zat* (Muslim caste).

Despite wishful talk about the emergence of a "British Islam," and despite the fact that Pakistanis tend to control central *Jami'a* mosques in almost all the major cities, Islam in Britain at the turn of the 21st century remains nationally and ethnically divided. There are Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Arab mosques, as well as Turkish and Shi'a mosques, and the language of sermons and even supplicatory prayers in the Pakistani mosques, whatever their tendency, is Urdu (or English) rather than Arabic. At the same time, children are taught to read the Koran in Arabic, and few can read and write in Urdu unless they study the language in high school as an examination subject.

While the proliferation of mosques in Britain reflects differences in nationality, language, and religious tendency, the main theological divide among Pakistani settlers has been between the majority Barelvis, Sufi followers who endorse the veneration of saints and love of the Prophet, and an array of Islamic reformist groups, some more fundamentalist than others, none radically Islamist in the sense of espousing violent revolution. All these groups have continued to be linked through viable

and ongoing transnational networks to religious centers or saints' lodges in Pakistan.

Until the 1990s, regional burial societies, known as *kommittis*, ensured that most people who died in Britain were buried in Pakistan. As families have matured, however, the increasing tendency has been to bury in local Muslim cemeteries, allocated by local authorities in Britain, a sure sign that many families are sinking roots in Britain. There has also been an extensive development of federated umbrella organizations uniting various Islamic groups across the whole of the United Kingdom.

This was very generally the picture of Islam in Britain before the Rushdie affair and subsequent international conflicts brought Muslims out onto the streets of British cities and onto global television screens. Until the publication of *The Satanic Verses*, Muslims in Britain were perceived as a law-abiding minority. The processes of differentiation and replication outlined here took place relatively peacefully, beyond the public gaze. Since the Rushdie affair, however, and even more so since 11 September, a kind of reversal of the usual process of religious incorporation has occurred. Instead of religion being defined as a legitimate source of identity for incoming migrants arriving in an established multifaith society, Islam has become a flag of political dissent. The growth of specifically anti-Muslim prejudice, Islamophobia, has exacerbated this process. So, too, has the related perception that mosques are sites of rhetorical vilification of the West and, in a few cases, of incitement to terror. Stripped of its experiential dimensions, beyond personal belief, Islam is now an oppositional badge. One may speak of an identity-led religiosity. This has led to a serious questioning in the British press and media of the loyalty of young, second-generation British Muslims and the extent of their identification with British society.

In this context first- and second-generation Pakistanis, men and women alike, are increasingly adopting Islamic diacritical ritual emblems and practices, which act as boundary markers, setting them apart from non-Muslim youngsters, including other young South Asians. Whereas the North Indian Islam of the migrant generation, embedded in Sufi traditions, tended to be relatively relaxed, with veiling and *purdah* abandoned in large measure by the Muslim middle classes when they settled in Britain, in contemporary Britain the wearing by women of *burqas*, elaborate veils, and North African-style headscarves, and of beards by men, is linked to

a total abstinence from drinking alcohol and a refusal to participate in British youth and student clubbing culture, which celebrates music, dance, sexuality, drink, and drugs.

This has led to a political discourse that accuses Muslims of self-segregation, while Sikhs and Hindu youngsters appear increasingly well integrated, although evidence exists that they, too, sometimes support extremist nationalist movements. Despite these accusations, young Pakistanis are, nevertheless, very British. Mosque attendance among the younger generation is a matter of choice and often quite low, although as Jacobson's (1998), Shain's (2000), and Modood's (1990, 1992) studies show, most youngsters remain pious and stress their Islamic identity, which they feel to be beleaguered both locally and globally.

Muslims in Britain have made some notable gains in their struggle for equal citizenship, especially the right to run their own state-funded Muslim schools. Young Muslims girls, while wearing the *hijab* (veil), are increasingly entering higher education and asserting the right to arrange their own marriages, with post hoc parental consent. They reject what they define as the Islamically uninformed and misguided customs of the parental generation. The politics of dissent has challenged the state to adopt more explicitly multicultural policies and public declarations of tolerance. South Asian Muslims participate actively in formal British politics, especially at the local level. There are about 150 Muslim South Asian councillors and a couple of MPs, as Purdam's (2000) study shows.

Nevertheless, the predicament of the Muslim diaspora in Britain has been that rather than gradual integration, with Islam accorded respect as a religion of tolerance and peace, the community has been unable to escape the stigma generated by international conflicts with their globally transmitted images of book- or effigy-burning Muslim mobs. Conflicts of identification create tragic dilemmas for diasporas, which are, by definition, transnational communities of coresponsibility. Pakistanis in Britain identify deeply with the plight of Palestinians, Bosnians, Kashmiris, Afghans, and Iraqis. They see the West, and especially the United States, as an oppressor. The result has been that rather than peaceful integration, the Muslim diaspora community in Britain has had to lurch from one crisis to another, from the Rushdie affair to the Gulf War to 11 September. The images of alienation

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these conflicts have generated have been exacerbated by the inner-city rioting of young Pakistanis in northern British towns and by the revelation that some young British Muslims had joined the Taliban and other extremist groups. This poses difficulties for Sikhs and Hindus as well, who are often racialized as "Pakis." Islamophobia thus has an impact on all South Asians in Britain. The diaspora was, and remains, complex, subject to fission and fusion, and not finally segmented once and for all.

It seems, then, that the politicization of Islam in Britain challenges the view that religion mediates the peaceful integration of immigrants into Western democracies as they strive to achieve equality in the public sphere. Against this relatively pessimistic prognosis, however, is the fact that Pakistanis in Britain have remained, on the whole, peaceful and pragmatic. Islam is a congregational religion, which provides a valued identity for immigrants. Much of it is home based, focused around rites of passage or communal Koran readings, which mobilize family and friends. Even religious study groups, known as *dars*, which have proliferated, are held in private homes. So, too, some of the smaller Sufi groups have mixed male and female *zikr* circles. There is little or no *pardah* practiced in homes, beyond formal etiquette. Most second-generation women move around freely, and drive and work in salaried employment. They are active in their own philanthropic voluntary associations and have their own religious experts. The younger generation, both men and women, is currently entering the open job market in large numbers. For many, Islam appears to be an adventure of self-discovery, an enjoyable substitute for British youth culture.

Paradoxically, perhaps, new wave South Asian satirical artistic works and reformist Islam in Britain share crucial features in common, despite their apparent difference. Both enunciate critical, oppositional discourses that attack "culture," "custom," and "tradition." In being focused on family politics, they open up spaces for young people to assert agency and autonomy, whether they draw on liberal discourses or Islamic ones. Either way, their right to choose, to seek knowledge, and to stand up to their parents is legitimized. There is much camaraderie in religious congregations and celebrations, as there is in youth culture.

Even in the public sphere, the politics of alliance rather than confrontation is also strikingly evident in

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Britain. In particular, the Stop the War alliance formed to protest against the war in Afghanistan in 2002, and expanded in the protests against the war in Iraq in 2003, incorporated diaspora Muslims as equal partners. The profoundly situational nature of identity as a personal badge was made evident in the emergence of this peace coalition, formed in Britain in the period leading to these two wars. Whereas in the Rushdie affair and first Gulf War, Muslims seemed apparently isolated in their support for Saddam Hussein or their endorsement of the *fatwa* against Rushdie, so that their Islamic identity was pitched against a Western or Judeo-Christian one, in the post-11 September alliance politics, Pakistanis' dissenting views were shared with a large majority in Britain. The Muslim Association of Britain, a federated national pro-Palestinian organization that represents Muslim opposition to the war and unites Palestinians with South Asians, was consciously incorporated by organizations such as **CND** and the Stop the War alliance as an equal partner.

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CONCLUSION: DIASPORA AND TRANSNATIONALISM

In conclusion, it is possible to identify a dialectical process in the formation of a Pakistani diaspora in Britain. On the one hand, Islam has been incorporative and integrative, providing a legitimate locational identity in an immigrant society. At the same time it has also generated its own contradictions and dilemmas, which have inhibited the integrative process by politicizing and racializing this very same religious identity. As South Asians, Pakistanis are increasingly part of a wider trend toward economic, cultural, and social incorporation into British society, whether as middle- or working-class citizens. It is likely that the community will remain divided in its orientations between extremely religious and secular minorities, with the majority, for whom Islamic piety combines with growing assimilation into British culture, occupying the middle ground.

Whether as South Asians or Muslims, the transnational commitments and connections of Pakistanis in Britain remain powerfully compelling both ideologically and practically. Home remittances from the United Kingdom to Pakistan through banks in 2002 to 2003 reached \$273.83 million (out of worldwide a total of

\$4.23 billion, \$1.23 billion from the United States followed by the Gulf States). A continuous stream of marriage partners and Muslim clerics from Pakistan augments the local community and revitalizes its distinctive culture. Domestic rituals, particularly weddings, have increased in their symbolic elaboration, scale, and sumptuousness as Pakistanis compete agonistically for status in the diaspora. Investment and retirement in Pakistan continue both for working- and middle-class Pakistanis. Imported cable TV stations, classical or popular music, and Bollywood films are widely available in the United Kingdom with its thriving South Asian consumer industry. So, too, are cassettes of leading Islamic preachers. The U.K. ethnic economy continuously forges new links to Pakistan and India. Visits by Pakistani dignitaries, politicians, artists, cricketers, and religious luminaries follow a well-trodden circuit of Pakistani urban concentrations. Above all, global events affecting Muslims elsewhere, and persistent hostilities between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, continue to shape the oppositional postcolonial diasporic consciousness of the community and to animate discourses enunciated by local leaders in the diasporic public sphere in Britain.

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